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Prof. E. Clive Chirwa v Zambia Railway & Another (2018/HP/0578) 
Kayula James1 
 
The plaintiff was appointed Chief Executive Officer of Zambia Railways by the late President, 
Michael Chilufya Sata, and subsequently his appointment was adopted by Zambia Railways 
when a contract of employment, dated 11th January 2013, was executed between the plaintiff 
and Zambia Railways. The contract was to run for a period of five years. One of the terms in 
the contract of employment provided: “In the event of premature termination of the contract by 
the company on grounds other than disciplinary, the employee shall be entitled to full payment 
of the amount due to him for the remaining part of the five-year contract.” 
 
By a letter dated 22nd April 2013, under the name and hand of the President of Zambia, the 
plaintiff was suspended from duty and placed on half salary, purportedly to facilitate 
investigations by the Anti-Corruption Commission. The suspension was in contravention of 
the Zambia Railways General Staff Regulation and Disciplinary Code and Procedure.  
By another letter dated 7th June 2013, also under the hand of the President of Zambia, the 
plaintiff was purportedly retired in the public interest without reference to, and in total 
disregard of, the conditions as stipulated in his contract of employment. At the time of the 
termination, the plaintiff had only served 7 months on the five-year contract he had entered 
into with Zambia Railways. 
 
As a consequence, the plaintiff instituted an action against Zambia Railways (1st Defendant) 
and the Attorney General (2nd Defendant). The plaintiff sought inter alia the declaration of the 
termination of his employment as unlawful and an award of damages. The Court found that the 
termination of employment was unlawful and awarded damages in form of gratuity, as well as 
salaries and other benefits as though the contract ran its full course of five years. 
 
Significance 
The starting point, in terms of legal analysis in this case, is the wording of the contract of 
employment between the plaintiff and Zambia Railways. The relevant part of the contract is 
provided under clause 3 of the contract of employment: “In the event of premature termination 
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of the contract by the company on grounds other than disciplinary, the employee shall be 
entitled to full payment of the amount due to him for the remaining part of the five-year 
contract.” 
 
Arising from this provision, the court concluded that since the contract provided for payment 
of all dues in case of premature termination, apart from termination on disciplinary grounds, 
the complainant was entitled to all the benefits as the contract provided.  
Indeed, a casual look at the wording of the contract would suggest that the plaintiff was entitled 
as per the contract terms. The general law of contract regarding contractual relations is well 
stated in the case of Colgate Palmolive Inc v Able Shemu and 110 Others, in this case, the 
courts stated that: 
 
If there is one thing more than another which public policy requires it is that men of full age and 
competent understanding shall have utmost liberty in contracting and that their contract when entered 
into freely and voluntarily shall be enforced by courts of justice.2 
 
 Courts observe and respect the sanctity of individual bargains and this is in recognition of the 
fundamental principle of freedom to contract enjoyed by men of full age and competent 
understanding. The courts have long regarded its role as one of, essentially, giving effect to the 
true and honest intention and expectations of the parties to a bargain. This general principle 
has, however, been modified when it comes to assessment of the quantum of damages in 
contracts of employment. The Supreme Court in the case of National Airports Corporation 
Limited v Reggie Ephraim Zimba and Saviour Konie,3 was confronted with a case of 
termination of a contract of employment whose wording is materially on all fours with 
Professor Chirwa’s. The contract of employment in the case National Airport Corporation 
provided for termination with three months notice by either party and went on to provide: 
 
If the employer terminates the contract prematurely for reasons other than incompetence or willful 
neglect of duty, all the benefits under the contract shall be paid as if the contract had run the full term. 
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The Industrial and Labour Relations Court, having looked at the wording of the contract in 
question, ordered that the damages for wrongful termination be computed as if the contract had 
run its full term. 
 
On appeal, the Supreme Court stated that damages for wrongful termination, where the contract 
provided that damages would be paid as though the contract had run its full term, can only be 
defended if the sum thereby stipulated can be held to be liquidated damage, that is to say, a 
genuine pre-estimate of the damages the parties themselves intended should govern the contract 
in the case of termination. The court further stated that the intention of the parties could not be 
implemented by the court if the sum is held to be a penalty. The court characterized the 
argument of Mr Mwanawasa, who argued that parties enter into contracts with their eyes wide 
open, by stating that none of them should be heard to complain that the bargain is or has become 
too onerous or unconscionable, as one which flew in the face of equitable intervention by the 
courts, and which had become too entrenched to require or permit fresh debate. The court noted 
that there are now rules or guidelines which have evolved over time and which can still be 
further developed for distinguishing liquidated damages from penalties.   
 
The Supreme Court cited the case of Mobil Oil Zambia Limited v Patel4 with approval, whose 
principle is to the effect that where the contract-breaker had a contractual option to terminate 
the contract, the court should assess the damages on the footing that the party in breach would 
have exercised the option. The Supreme Court thus held,  
 
In this case, the damages should relate to the period of three months of salary and perquisites and any 
other accrued benefits such as gratuity over that period. We find and hold the phrase invoked so as to 
pay damages as if the contract had run its full course offends the rules which  were first propounded as 
propositions by Lord Dunedin, in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company Limited v New Garage And Motor 
Company Limited, especially that the resulting sum stipulated for is in effect bound to be extravagant 
and unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to 
have followed from the breach.  
 
The decision above handed down by the Supreme Court demonstrates that, in cases of breach 
of a contract of employment, damages payable are distinguishable from those under the general 
law of contract. This case gives critical guidelines which a court faced with the assessment of 
                                                             





damages in contracts of employment must invoke, especially for chief executives or very senior 
positions whose contracts normally provide to the effect that in case of termination on grounds 
other than incompetence, damages would be paid as though the contract had run its full term. 
The binding principle as laid down by the Supreme Court, is that even where the contract 
provides that damages are to be paid in case of termination as though the contract had run its 
full term, the court would not implement such an intention as it is analogous to a penalty, that 
it is to say, implementation of such an intention has the effect of penalizing the other party. 
Instead, the court will order damages equivalent to what complaint would have been paid had 
the notice period been given in accordance with the contract of employment. In other words, if 
the contract provided for termination notice of three months, the court would order that 
damages for wrongful termination be paid in reference to the period of notice regardless of 
stipulations that benefits be paid as though the contract had run its full-term. The court arrived 
at this position because there is no justification, whatsoever, for paying an employee full 
benefits as if the contract has run its full term when he has only served a fraction of the term 
as doing so would constitute unjust enrichment of an employee. Such a payment would be 
gratuitous unsupported by consideration, and as such lacking legal basis. 
 
Further, in the case of Zambia State Insurance and Attorney General v Allisand Singogo,5 the 
Supreme Court also considered the quantum of damages for breach of contract involving a 
managing director and chief executive of Zambia State Insurance. The contract of employment 
provided for notice period of three months in case of termination by either party or pay in lieu 
of notice. The contract further stated, “the employee shall immediately be paid in full all 
monetary benefits and be able to exercise the option to purchase any articles, items or such 
related equipment the employee would have befitted if the contract had run its full-term.” The 
court, in reversing the award of damages granted by the lower court, held that there was need 
to exercise caution in deciding the measure of damages to avoid virtual reinstatement without 
consideration and run away damages of “near vengeance”. The court reiterated the principle as 
laid down in the Zimba and Konnie case (cited above) that where there is a breach of contract 
of employment, and the party in breach had an option of terminating, the complainant would 
be awarded damages equivalent to what he would have been paid had the notice period been 
given regardless of the intention of the parties.  
 
                                                             





The jurisprudence in Zambia, therefore, with respect to damages for breach of contract of 
employment, is that payment of benefits in terms of salaries and gratuity for the unexpired term 
of the contract is highly untenable as it lacks consideration. Such a payment when effected 
constitutes unjust enrichment. Paying an employee benefits for the unexpired term is also 
regarded a penal act on the employer and as such frowned upon by the courts.  
 
In view of the principles and authorities discussed, it becomes very clear that the High Court 
erred in awarding Professor Chirwa damages for the unexpired period of the contract of 
employment. The award is therefore unlawful as it offends the entrenched principles laid down 
by the Supreme Court in awarding damages in contracts of employment. It must be stressed 
categorically that there is no authority that supports the award of damages for the unexpired 
period of the contract on account of special circumstances because such an award or awards 
are regarded to be too extravagant and constitute what the Supreme Court referred to as “virtue 
reinstatement without consideration” and run away damages of near vengeance. Put it 
differently, such awards are avoided because they smack of unjust enrichment and are 
analogous to penalizing the employer.  
 
The correct position in the case at hand would have been to award damages to the plaintiff 
commensurate to the notice period stipulated under the contract of employment. Gratuity and 
other perquisites should have equally been paid on a prorated basis. The court also did not 
consider the concept of mitigation of loss and in this particular case, the court should have paid 
attention and ascertained whether the Plaintiff had prospects of finding alternative 
employment. Taking this factor into account helps courts to avoid excessive awards of damages 
in both employment and ordinary contracts. 
 
Conclusion  
This case is a stain on the stilts of clear and well-entrenched principles relating to awarding of 
damages in employment contracts. The case departs radically from the consistent and 
unwavering pronouncements by the Supreme of Zambia on the considerations a court should 
take into account when faced with the determination of quantum of damages in employment. 
In view of the fact that there has already been sound pronouncements on this matter by the 
Supreme Court, the Chirwa case is of no jurisprudential value and may soon be consigned to 
the dustbin of history. 
